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PERSPECTIVES ON ‘THE LENS OF RISK’ INTERVIEW SERIES 
INTERVIEW WITH NICK PIDGEON 
 




This article is the first in a series which will appear in 2012 in the special mega-issue 
'Health Care Through the Lens of Risk'. It provides a quasi-verbatim transcript of an 
interview with Nick Pidgeon, one of the main contributors to the social science 
component of the Royal Society Risk Report (1992). The interview contains a 
fascinating insider account of the debate about risk between engineers and social 
scientists who produced the report. It also offers some important reflections on the 
fissure which has opened up between risk sociology and research concerned with 




At the suggestion of the editor of Health. Risk & Society, Andy Alaszewski, Patrick 
Brown and Bob Heyman have undertaken a series of interviews with a sample of 
leading risk social scientists, including Andy Alaszewski, Judy Green, Nick Pidgeon, 
Ortwin Renn, Paul Slovic, Peter Taylor-Gooby and Joost Van Loon. 
 
The interviews will be presented across the series of special issues on Health Care 
Through the Lens of Risk which will appear in 2012. They cover views about: the 
meaning, if any, of the term ‘risk’; the significance of the Royal Society (2002) Risk 
report; the history of risk social science; and the impact of risk thinking on the wider 
society and on government policy. All of these topics will not necessarily be covered 
in every interview. Instead the most interesting material will be selected. The chosen 
interview content will be presented more or less verbatim, with a few contextual 
clarifications and interviewer comments added either in square brackets or footnotes, 
with ‘…’  used to mark small omissions. The interviewees were given the opportunity 
to lightly edit the text and to add references which are presented in footnotes. The 
order of presentation has been varied from the actual interview sequence which was 
variable and free-flowing.  
 
The interview series will start with Nick Pidgeon who was first author of the chapter 
on ‘risk perception’ in the 1992 Royal Society Risk report. The interview contains a 
fascinating insider account of the debate about risk between engineers and social 
scientists. It also offers some important reflections on the fissure which has opened 




Nick Pidgeon with Bob Heyman, 27/10/11 
 
How do you see your own contribution to risk social science? 
 
Nick: I started … doing work on the causes of major accidents in the 1980s, from a 
human and organisational perspective, [around the question] ‘What does it mean for 
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physical systems, or more accurately socio-technical systems, to fail?’. And it was an 
extremely influential   period for me personally, working alongside an engineer, 
David Blockley, at Bristol and the organisational sociologist Barry Turner who was 
then at Exeter. The project suited me because I had always resisted being 
categorised into a single discipline, and it also taught me to listen carefully to the risk 
languages being used in different disciplinary perspectives. And risk is always a bit 
like that as well. So I worked on organisational safety for a number of years, but then 
gradually drifted into the risk communication and public perception domain. In 
methodological terms, I’d always done mixed methods research too, as I am always 
very comfortable with that approach myself, although sometimes it’s a bit difficult to 
write it up. Many of my empirical projects now have both a quantitative aspect and a 
qualitative aspect because each tends to illuminate different aspects of the 
phenomena under study … sometimes without actually writing all of it up as a whole, 
because it’s actually very difficult to write up mixed methods work for the peer-
reviewed literature. So you find lying behind many of my papers are projects which 
have got more than one data stream coming in, helping to inform the overall 
theoretical analysis. But sometimes they don’t always end up in the same empirical 
paper together … A very good example here would be our recent work on the 
‘reluctant acceptance’ of nuclear power.i,ii 
Bob: That thing about mixed methods and the difficulty of getting published - have 
you any further comments on that?  So what you are saying is you felt some 
pressure to divide up, and do a qualitative paper and a quantitative paper? 
Nick: It’s easier to do that. It’s not a pressure, it is just conceptually easier. 
Bob: Oh, conceptually easier, 
Nick: Well, it can be conceptually and in terms of what the journals want. 
Bob: That’s what I thought you meant. 
Nick: Yes. I am not sure that I would put Health Risk Society in that bracket because 
I think they are pretty comfortable as is the Journal of Risk Research. But with the 
journal Risk Analysis, you would struggle to get good qualitative studies in,  and 
overall there are very few mixed methods [papers] anywhere. It’s really a length 
problem,  it’s often as simple as that -  to get all aspects of mixed methods work 
properly integrated into a concise paper is tricky. One paper I am particularly proud 
of was on foot and mouth disease in 2004iii, which was subsequently highlighted by 
Alan Bryman the social sciences methodologist  in his review of mixed methods 
research. That was after the outbreak appeared suddenly, and then we completed a 
survey very quickly, not the best survey in the world, but it was good enough, in 
Norwich (which was not near the outbreak) and  one of the severe outbreak areas in 
Cornwall. And then we followed it up with focus groups in both locations afterwards, 
and did write quite a nice paper putting both parts of that study together. So you can 
- sometimes it works. It was neatly contained the whole thing. So it can be done.  
Bob: Was there any particular reason for your shift from looking at systems to 
looking at public perceptions, other than it just happened? 
Nick: I think a pragmatic response would be there were funding opportunities. There 
were more funding opportunities because there was the post-Sevesoiv research 
agenda - there was European funding available as a result for risk communication 
and emergency response type projects which I got involved in very early, in the 90s 
that would be. And those would have been my first proper research projects to be 
involved in - funded research projects. And then there were several HSEv projects 
which were more on the public perception side, and were HSE’s response to the 
social sciences research agenda set out in the Royal Society report. 
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Bob: … Is that partly, being very cynical …, because the powers-that-be who dish 
out the money would be more happy about it - ‘And we have got to understand how 
the public perceive it, perhaps to educate them or whatever’, whereas looking at the 
systems actually - 
Nick: I think that’s a very fair comment. I don’t think it is a cynical comment … There 
are a set of questions in the original Royal Society report that are being asked, some 
of which are more relevant to policy than others. The system stuff is also there, it’s 
just, again, who wants to sponsor it? In fact a number of UK researchers did go on to 
study high technology risk systems and high reliability organisations further… I am 
thinking of my colleagues Rhona Flin and Kathryn Mearns at Aberdeen … who 
would be a good example conducting really good work in the offshore oil industry in 
the 90s. Latterly, the funding opportunities in the systems field shifted, with growing 
interest in ‘medical error’  in healthcare following the UK Department of Health 
‘Organisation With A Memory’  report in 2000. And I have never personally felt drawn 
to working in hospitals - too many governance procedures to go through before you 
get near the study. So a number of people moved in that direction, I think, and that’s 
the way the field gets blown about, almost, over time.  
 
One new thing that has emerged which is different from when, I think, the 1992 
Royal Society report was done, because it always talks about very conventional 
risks, is the area of emerging technologies. So, that’s things like nanotechnologyvi, 
and currently in the climate arena, it would be geo-engineeringvii. In biotechnology 
also, there is  synthetic biology as an extension of GM. And that raises all sorts of 
different and difficult questions. And I think, for me, that’s so interesting - how do you 
study a risk perception of something that doesn’t yet exist, that is merely imaginary 
…? Do you then construct the risk object by doing the research, if you see what I 
mean?viii 
 
How do you understand the term ‘risk’? 
 
Nick: My background is in mathematics originally when I was at school. And [at] 
university I then did a joint degree in mathematics and psychology at Keele. And I 
guess, as a result, I ended up in a space that’s really called science and technology 
studies. This field does see risk as a constructed phenomenon - but, as David 
Blockley taught me at Bristol, you can appreciate that from an engineering point of 
view too, as well as through the more traditional sociology treatments, strangely 
enough. People who work on uncertainty in engineering, if they are smart enough 
and read some of the philosophy of science, will happily say ‘Engineering models 
aren’t real - there is a whole raft of judgements that go into them - and acceptable 
risk isn’t something that you can calculate from a purely scientific perspective’. It has 
a science and engineering component. yes, but also a judgement and value 
component … But I also personally resist an entirely relativist view of risk as well. So 
I mean, whether I irritate people or not, I’m often, I mean it’s the ‘death and furniture’ 
argument, which in risk studies  is probably not so well known. There was a vigorous 
debate in British social psychology in the mid-90s, when discourse analysis had just 
started to become very influential ... And for the positivists within social psychology, 
the final line of defence was - this is a piece of furniture and that these things exist, 
or that when people die you can’t [sensibly deny that]. And then colleagues at 
Loughborough wrote a slightly ironic article titled ‘death and furniture’ix, arguing [that] 
even such things  could be seen as socially constructed. Now, there is a sense in 
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which that’s true - objects or phenomena are  always seen through a social lens. But 
I think there is a sense in which risk has real consequences in the world toox, so you 
have to respect the possibility of death or harm as well. And so I am often found 
arguing that there is a two-faced nature to risk … The social amplification model is a 
bit like this that … where it [risk] is seen through a whole set of socially constructed 
phenomena which are all interesting and complex and contextually shaped. This is 
why psychology alone doesn’t answer all of the most interesting questions which one 
might pose. You have to have sociology and geography and other disciplines 
involved, but you have also to come back to that fact that you … are dealing with 
phenomena that potentially can kill people.  
Bob: Yes. So there is something there even if people’s behaviour is determined by 
how they view it and how they feel about it. 
Nick: Yes well, and then again, … Paul Slovic is fond of saying … that perceptions 
can be very  real in their consequences. And, again, that’s quite a straightforward 
and well known psychological and sociological idea from many, many years back, 
which I think is true isn’t it? If you see people buying salt in China as a result of 
Fukushima, it may well be a perception and entirely wrong to suggest there was 
radiation exposure in Beijingxi. But if people believed it was going to protect them, 
they would go and buy the salt. Whether they were using it or not is a different 
matter.  
 
The second point is the limitation of classical probability as a model for every ‘risk’. I 
always think of Andy Stirling’s work on defining ambiguity and ignorance here. But … 
even in the 1992 Royal Society report, I made  the distinction between more 
measurable forms of risk that are more closely tied to either well-understood risk-
generating systems or observed within long-run empirical evidence, and risks where 
the evidence is more uncertain or sparse. So take the risk of being run over in 
Cardiff. While every street is different of course - we won’t get into an argument 
about that - the risk of dying in the coming year as an average pedestrian user, is 
obtainable through empirical frequency probability. So, that’s kind of one end of it. 
And then you move through to uncertainty, which in effect involves a greater degree 
of subjective judgement about phenomena that might, say, only happen once, but 
you might still have information that bears on that problem that helps you to make 
decisions about that problem; so that’s a Bayesian model of risk. Finally, you have 
what’s thought of now as more ill-structured uncertainty … the domain of ignorance, 
where either probabilities or consequences or both, i.e. the structure of the model, 
are fundamentally undetermined ... It’s not risk, but it’s a deep form of uncertainty 
and ignorance so there is a kind of a spectrum there. Andy Stirling talks about a two-
by-two model, and you have got uncertainty either more, or less, well-defined and 
consequences either more, or less, well-defined. And, of course, risk is in only one 
quadrant where you have well-defined systems, and ignorance is its antithesis, with 
ambiguity and uncertainty as intermediate states. So I like that set of ideas, although 
intellectually you can trace this  back to David Collingridge in his book Social Control 
of Technology from 1982, where he talks about the dilemma of control in decision-
making under ignorance. And I have always seen those distinctions as critical, which 
is why I covered them in the original Royal Society chapter  … 
Bob: Would you disagree with the Bayesian view? … If it’s uncertainty that you can 
quantify, like with the road case, you would call that risk. But it’s not actually different 




Nick: There is a very good book called Comparative Statistical Inference by Vic 
Barnettxii which I read years ago when at university which tried to lay this out in terms 
of mathematical theory, and there he made some fairly strong distinctions. So you 
have classical probability, relative frequency probability, Bayesian probability and 
uncertainty. And I think there is a leap between relative frequency probability where 
you really do – you have been able to observe some things under relatively repeated 
situations, and you know the new situation is like the old situation, even though you 
don’t know what is actually creating the chance phenomenon per se. You know it’s 
just a load of random crazy driving errors around the city of Cardiff generating the 
accidents, but they all add up to the same thing year on year. But uncertainty, 
Bayesian uncertainty, is different again because it’s fundamentally a psychological 
phenomenon, it’s about a degree of belief. There are philosophical debates about 
how different they are. There is a sense in which relative frequency probability is also 
a degree of belief, so Bayesians would say they are the same fundamental concept. 
Equally, the classical people would say there is nothing more than relative frequency 
…Those ideas of course bridged my original intellectual interests in both 
mathematics and psychology. 
 
Do you know Charles Perrow’s work on normal accidentsxiii? He’s an organisational 
sociologist – an American sociologist - and his view of risk is [that] it’s inherent in the 
system. My colleague Barry Turner had also made the same fundamental 
observation in 1978 in his earlier book Man-Made Disasters. Both  pointed to deep 
forms of ignorance that you couldn’t easily predict. Perrow claimed that you couldn’t 
predict what would eventually go wrong at the Three Mile Island nuclear power 
station per se because of the complexity and the coupled nature of the interacting 
system elements. So he argues that some systems are, by their very properties, 
prone to unanticipated accidents that you would not even be able to envisage in a 
Bayesian sense. And his argument is also, of course, an argument against just 
taking a purely statistical, fatalities-based approach to risk. It’s much more about 
trying to understand the properties of the risk generating systems and organisations. 
And I think one of the lessons from Fukushima is that we are going to have to think 
through more of those types of blind spots in our models of high-risk systems. So it’s 
ignorance again, and that’s got a very real set of implications for policy. The German 
policy response [to Fukushima] has been to  take a very precautionary view on its 
significance. But the British and American response has been, ‘No we will try and 
learn from this, and will carry on [with nuclear]’. 
 
What do you think of the Royal Society definition of risk? How do you view the 
impact and significance of the Royal Society (1992) Risk monograph? 
 
Nick: If you look at my chapter in the Royal Society report, there is a little aside 
about common mode failuresxiv, something that had been known for a long time in 
the risk world. Under such circumstances you have to be quite careful that the 
standard combination laws are not making inappropriate assumptions about 
independence of events …  
Bob: Sometimes as well, I mean, the assumption of independence is … linked to the 
quantification of risk, as you said. 
Nick: Yes and I think that [quantification] is  what the Royal Society wanted at the 
time. And, as a result, they could have done without the social science chapters 
really, which was the history, because they weren’t very happy with some of the 
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things we wrote. There had been  a ‘risk group’  meeting regularly at the London 
School of Economics, who were  asked to review and write the social sciences 
material, which is what we did. I took on chapter five on risk perception and 
communication, and Chris Hood took on chapter six on risk management. Having 
been involved subsequently in other Royal Society reports, and now knowing the 
process they normally use, this report was not written like that. Normally they would 
get a committee of experts together, perhaps over a year. They would meet to 
discuss  the broad principles and text, and then certain members would go away with 
the secretariat and write various bits. Ultimately, however, a report is an agreed 
statement  of the Society, sanctioned by the Council as an authoritative statement 
from ‘science’ so to speak. In this case we did not arrive at  an agreed report of the 
Society because when they got our two social science chapters … there was 
objection to the way I had developed the objective/subjective risk debate. And, in the 
first draft, I had developed the argument of Fischhoff’s book ‘Acceptable Risk’xv, 
which is that risk assessment involves judgement all the way along the line, and 
therefore there is no real thing, there is no such thing as a real risk, it is - 
Bob: Depending on the judgements and - 
Nick: Yes science and values, science plus engineering judgement plus values. And 
I was fairly confident that this set of arguments would stand up. But that does lead to 
the unfortunate conclusion (from the Society’s standpoint at the time) that risk itself is  
a subjective phenomenon. And they did not take to that, and objections were raised 
when it went out to peer review. In turn, our group were confident that the arguments 
were sound and in line with the very best thinking in the risk community of the time. 
The Society argued that this claim either had to be changed, or they would could not 
endorse it, because risk to them was a real thing. And so they were thinking from the 
conventional  engineering science perspective, and there was also objection by 
referees to a fairly innocuous table I had inserted based upon  the work of Charles 
Vlek which made the simple point that there are multiple definitions of risk in the 
literature and in risk practice … And, of course, the Society wanted a single 
definition. And a report like this was not going to be useful if it didn’t have a single 
definition of risk! So if you look right at the start there they define risk as - 
Bob: That’s the one I have got there, yesxvi. 
Nick: Yes. So then, that went to Council, and there are several levels of report. Level  
I report or whatever … the highest categorisation of report is a statement agreed by 
Council that’s said to be true as the Council sees it at that point in time, and not the 
opinion of the individual who might have written it. If they can’t agree on the report, 
that it’s a true statement of the Society, then it becomes a Grade II report which is 
what this [the Risk report] eventually became. So then the individual chapters are 
described at the start as the individual views of the individual authors. It had the odd 
effect of, elevating one’s name onto the chapter - whereas in a normal Society 
report, irrespective of your level of input, you would merely be listed in the Appendix 
as a committee member. So that whole argument had some interesting career 
implications … 
Bob: Yes not bad I suppose? 
Nick: Not bad. Well, it was different … At the time I could actually attribute the work 
to myself, and use it as a REFxvii publication whereas I wouldn’t otherwise have been 
able to do that [in a consensual Royal Society report] … In preparing for my chapter, 
as quite a junior lecturer at Birkbeck College at that time, I had written to many of the 
well-known people in the field, people who subsequently became very good 
colleagues such as Paul Slovic and Roger Kasperson, Ortwin Renn, Tim O’Riordan 
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and of course Brian Wynne at Lancaster. I explained that a revision of the earlier 
Royal Society report was underwayxviii, and that they now wanted an expanded 
chapter on risk perception and communication. So what were they working on 
currently? What were the key debates? To my surprise  I received letters back from 
almost everyone I wrote to, which then helped enormously to structure the 
intellectual content of Chapter 5. I still have these letters somewhere in a box, and so 
that was a part our defence. I said, ‘Look, I’m sorry. I have spoken to every 
international [scholar] in the field I know of, and this is what they came up with’, and 
this chapter is just reflecting some of the things they have said … 
 
Anyway, so the history then became told as a very acrimonious process. And it had 
actually, I mean probably was, more acrimonious than the actual authors realised at 
the time, because I think it probably went on in the Society - should we publish it in 
this form or not? In the end they decided to do it. Because, as it turned out, and as I 
am sure you will know, the report became one of their best-selling and most 
influential reports for many years. And, then, after three or four years, it was clear 
that the science policy people at the Royal Society were changing, and they realised 
they had actually got closer to the state of the art than they had imagined … So it 
should, I suppose, have appeared as a full Society report with the benefit of 
hindsight. 
Bob: But it actually contributed to what I suppose was a change in climate anyway? 
Nick: Yes, absolutely, yes. And people  then started to think more about the social 
sciences aspects. It led to a whole raft of other initiatives like the Risk and Human 
Behaviour Research Programme that the ESRCxix subsequently commissioned. And 
again, the report helped the ESRC to make the case to have a programme on risk … 
The other thing that it stimulated, that I was also involved with, was funding from the 
Health and Safety Executive for social science research. So there was work on risk 
evaluation within environmental economics and on workplace risk communication. 
But they were also brave enough to sponsor work on social amplification of risk. HSE 
had in effect a mini-programme, enough anyway to sponsor three projects, one of 
which was the seminar project that produced the book Social Amplification of Riskxx. 
So it led to some government funding which would not otherwise have been there. I 
am pretty certain that was because the HSE risk policy people read this stuff and 
thought, ‘The social side is very important for us and our work on societal risk - we 
have got to engage with it’. I don’t think they would do it now. They wouldn’t have the 
resources now to do what, in effect, was a more blue skies form of research. 
 
How do you see the history of risk social science? 
 
Nick: One recent development has been many  sociologists becoming interested [in 
large-scale risk systems analysis], but most of them, I would say, are not risk 
researchers particularly. Let’s consider the Beck argument, the whole argument 
about Beck. Conceptually his work is very  illuminating, but nevertheless a number of 
us were always quite sceptical as to how well it articulated with mainstream risk 
research. And I think that that still seems to be the case; that it’s not influential [in 
applied risk systems research], but it has been within sociology more widely. I mean, 
yes, if you take Beck’s book and line it up against Turner’s work, or Perrow’s bookxxi, 
or Dianne Vaughan’s classic account of the Challenger disasterxxii … Perrow and 
Vaughan are now very  well-known within the risk management field, particularly in 
the US. Barry Turner was equally well-known in Europe, and a number of key 
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developments flowed naturally from all of their work, all of the safety culture and high 
reliability organisation work etc. ... Yet, given they were all  mainstream sociologists, 
they are often completely ignored within mainstream ‘risk sociology’. Now isn’t that 
strange? And yet every sociologist has read Ulrich Beck’s book. Why is that?  
Bob: Yes, that’s what I was going to ask you! 
Nick: When we come to Fukushima, it’s absolutely clear that Perrow’s book tells us 
far, far more about that event and its risk significancexxiii than Risk Society [Beck] will 
tell us. Risk Society may tell us about some of the wider responses to the event, and 
perhaps I frame it too narrowly around the risk management questions - how you 
keep the system safe, what’s dangerous or not, risky or not … So sociology has 
made very good inputs into the risk field, but it’s also carved out a niche that it calls 
risk but which still struggles to articulate with the field … For example, Beck talks 
about anxiety and individual biographies of risk which in theory ought to be relevant 
to risks from nuclear power through to the more everyday type such as health risks. 
There is an excellent book by Tulloch and Luptonxxiv where they  try to work through 
Beck’s analysis in relation to the everyday, and find that it doesn’t quite articulate 
with their qualitative data. We have also done work with residents near nuclear 
facilities in the UK. And if there is one place where ‘risk society’ ought to be 
prompting the eternally anxious subject, it’s there. And yet, while anxiety clearly can 
be generated even by the very thought of radiation and nuclear power, we also 
obtained some very similar findings to Tulloch and Luptonxxv.  
Bob: So that, essentially, people are quite pragmatic? 
Nick: Quite pragmatic when living with nuclear risks, yes, except that everybody can 
also tell you about an instance of when they felt rather uncomfortable, and, for some, 
exceptionally uncomfortable, at the thought of nuclear power. So moments of anxiety 
do exist.  
Bob: And that would be based around an incident? 
Nick: It could be when people hear mediated accounts, such as the terrorist 
bombings in London, when Chernobyl occurred, and so it would have been within 
the last six months when Fukushima occurred. Then, many people living around the 
sites would be prompted to ask themselves the [safety] question. And strangely 
enough, it also happens when you get anything odd happening at a plant. So if you 
are having an emergency exercise and local people have not been told, then they 
can become concerned … We’ve described it, drawing upon the work of 
anthropologist Joe Masco, in terms of the ‘nuclear uncanny’ -  that nuclear 
technology has taken on a set of associations with world-making and world-
destroying powers, and the invisiblexxvi. It’s not just a purely psychological thing as 
well. It’s about the way nuclear has been positioned within discourses about science 
and society that sets it apart. So it’s a strange technology even now, and that then 
generates anxiety. And I have even had nuclear specialists saying exactly the same 
thing - that this analysis applies to them. Although they think it’s great, it’s safe, there 
is nothing wrong with it, and they have confidence in the risk management and 
assessments, they have had at least one experience of feeling, ‘Oh dear, this is 
about to go wrong, and now this really does worry me’.  
 
Do you think risk has become a key element of government policy? 
 
Bob: would you say the UK government policy has become more risk-orientated, for 
better or worse, over the last 20 years or so? 
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Nick: I think it did for a while, because we had the Cabinet Office Risk report in 2002 
which was trying to instantiate risk thinking. And I think, of course, the parallel thing 
going on at that time was the insertion of chief scientists in all of the UK government 
departments. So I think automatically, once you have  senior scientists sitting at 
policy level … this lends to phrasing policy in risk terms. So I think there is more 
technical expertise in risk. But there is also, … there is more scientific thinking, I 
think, and that immediately, then immediately the model you are going to use is a 
risk-based model. That may or may not be entirely desirable, of course, but I think 
that’s clearly the case. But alongside that … there is a danger that it just becomes a 
wider thing about ‘risk management of everything’, as Mike Powerxxvii puts it, as 
applied to government. And the Cabinet Office report  - good report though it is - has 
become proceduralised to some extent. I think that would be the way to talk about it - 
institutionalised in a not very reflective way at times.  
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